This paper analyses the relations between philosophy of information (PI), library and information science (LIS) and social epistemology (SE). In the first section, it is argued that there is a natural relation between philosophy and LIS but that SE cannot provide a satisfactory foundation for LIS. SE should rather be seen as sharing with LIS a common ground, represented by the study of information, to be investigated by a new discipline, PI. I n the second section, the nature of PI is outlined a s the philosophical area that studies the conceptual nature of information, its dynamics and problems. In the third section, LIS is defined as a form of applied PI. The hypothesis supported is that PI should replace SE as the philosophical discipline that can best provide the conceptual foundation for LIS. In the conclusion, it is suggested that the "identity" crisis undergone by LIS has been the natural outcome of a justified but precocious search for a philosophical c ounterpart that has emerged only recently, namely PI. The development of LIS should not rely on some borrowed, pre-packaged theory. A s applied PI, LIS can fruitfully contribute to the growth of basic theoretical research in PI itself and thus provide its own foundation.
Introduction
When Don Fallis kindly invited me to contribute to this special issue of Social Epistemology, we agreed that it would have been interesting to investigate the conceptual triangle constituted by theoretical studies in library and information science (LIS), social epistemology (SE) and a new area of philosophical research that in other contexts 1 I have defined as the philosophy of information (PI). This paper can be read as a n exploration of the internal forces regulating the location and distance between three poles: LIS, SE and PI. The following figure summarises the main thesis defended in the following pages:
Let me explain it. LIS is strictly related to both SE and PI, but in the first section I try to show that SE cannot provide LIS with a satisfactory foundation. In terms of family resemblance, LIS and SE are more like siblings and should be understood as sharing a common parent, namely PI. PI is the philosophical area that studies the conceptual nature of information, its dynamics and problems. I define it in the second section, where PI is succinctly introduced. In the third section, I put together the two strands and, following Herold (2001) , I try to show that LIS should be understood as applied PI. In the conclusion, I advance two further suggestions. First, the "identity" crisis undergone by LIS was the natural outcome of a justified but precocious search for a philosophical counterpart that has emerged only very recently, namely PI. For many decades, researchers in LIS have been asking the right questions but researchers in philosophy were not yet ready to answer them. Second, a good test for a "foundational" candidate is to check whether it is able to learn from its applied counterpart. I argue that PI passes this test. The development of LIS as applied PI can fruitfully and substantially contribute to the growth of basic theoretical research in PI itself. LIS does not need to acquire some ready-made philosophical foundation, it can play a key role in shaping one.
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Social Epistemology cannot provide a foundation for Library and Information

Science
Library and information science (LIS) has often been closely associated to philosophy because of the level, scope and topics of their investigations. 2 The relation between the two fields seems intuitive and undeniable, but specifying its precise nature has proved a complex and controversial task.
It has been suggested, rather influentially, that both disciplines share the same metatheoretical level of investigation:
Librarianship and philosophy, while each possessing unique material content (such as it is), very probably have the same ultimate forms; and they are both metasciences par excellence. (Wright 1977 , 11-12, cited in Herold 2001 ).
This view is suggestive but incorrect, as I shall show in section 3.
Regarding the scope and topic of investigation, it has been argued that Like your profession [librarian] , mine [philosopher] also has thrust upon it, as its appropriate domain, the whole of knowledge, the whole of culture; nothing is supposed to be foreign to us, and we ought to be prepared under suitable circumstances to be helpful with regard to any and every area of human concern. Like you, we cannot even begin to occupy ourselves with the substance and content of this endless domain, but only with its form, with its structure, with its order, with the inter-relations of the various parts. (Kaplan, 1965 , cited in Gorman 2000 .
Unfortunately, this suggestion is unsatisfactory because too vague. LIS and philosophy certainly share an encyclopaedic scope, but this holds equally true of science in general. Philosophy, like science, is an umbrella word for a very large variety of disciplines. We need something much more specific, if we wish to understand its relation with LIS. This requirement has been well expressed by Hjùrland (2000, 6) :
The real challenge for information science [that is LIS] is therefore to develop specific knowledge, which is relatively independent of subject knowledge, but which is not an empty abstraction [my insertion].
A classic attempt to solve the previous difficulties has been made by interpreting LIS in terms of social epistemology (SE). Shera (1961 Shera ( , 1965 Shera ( , 1970 Shera ( , 1973 has been one of the leading figures in this trend (see Rawski 1972) . He argued that 'Social epistemology' [. . .] will provide a framework for the effective investigation of the entire complex of problem of the intellectual processes of society -a study by which society as a whole seeks a perceptive relation to its total environment. It should lift the study of intellectual life from that of a scrutiny of the individual to an inquiry into the means by which society, nation, or culture achieves understanding of the totality of stimuli which act upon it. The focus of this new discipline will be upon the production, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought throughout the entire social pattern. From such a discipline should emerge a new body of knowledge about, and a new synthesis of, the interaction between knowledge and social activity. (Shera 1961, 15-16) LIS is certainly close to social epistemology insofar as both disciplines are interested in the social dynamics of their object, have a wide scope and an empirical orientation.
Nevertheless, this approach too fails to be fully satisfactory. SE cannot provide a foundation for LIS. The task of this section is to show why. At a time when sociological approaches where fashionable, Shera explicitly identified the distinction between SoK and ESK and defended the importance of interpreting librarianship in terms of the latter rather than the former (see for example Shera 1970, 107-108) . Shera had a very inclusive conception of ESK. Not only did he think that it was basically "epistemology made social". He also saw it as a theory of everything that might be generally understood in epistemic terms:
Such discipline is here denominated, for want of more accurately descriptive term 'social epistemology', by which is meant the study of those processes by which society as a whole seeks to achieve a perceptive or understanding relation to the total environment -physical, psychological, and intellectual. [...] Social epistemology merely lifts the discipline [epistemology] from the intellectual life of the individual to that of the society, nation, or culture. (Shera 1965, p. 27) Shera spoke, rather vaguely, of a "very important affinity between it [Social Epistemology] and librarianship" (Shera 1970, 88) but then endorsed the strong view that "social epistemology can give librarianship its intellectual foundation for which we have been searching for so long" (Shera 1970, 108 (Shera 1961, 169) Librarianship is the management of human knowledge, the most interdisciplinary of all the disciplinesand because it is concerned with the philosophy of knowledge it is potentially the most deeply philosophical of all the professions" (Shera 1965 , 176, see also Shera 1973 SE and LIS do not make a happy marriage because LIS works at a more fundamental level than epistemology. Its object is not knowledge itself but the information sources that make it possible, even if only indirectly. Thus, the online ALA Glossary defines Library Science as the professional knowledge and skill by which recorded information is selected, acquired, organized, and utilized in meeting the information demands and needs of a community of users (http://thorplus.lib.purdue.edu/engr/glossary.html also quoted in Stieg, 1992 , who criticises the lack of the "humanistic side" of librarianship in this description).
And Borko (1968) argues that information science is an interdisciplinary science that investigates the properties and behavior of information, the forces that govern the flow and use of information, and the techniques, both manual and mechanical, of processing information for optimal storage, retrieval and dissemination (p. 5).
To focus only on knowledgewhether to assess or criticise its possibility and natureintroduces an epistemological bias inconsistent with the real nature of LIS.
Of course, anything can be used as a source of knowledge, at least because, reflexively, anything can be a source of knowledge about itself and its reference. But this is exactly why LIS has a much wider scope than epistemology. It would be very misleading to conclude that LIS' object is therefore only the domain of organised knowledge itself, even if one adopts Shera's very liberal concept of knowledge. 7 This is probably why Kaplan, i n the quotation given above, also speaks of "culture". In this way one can avoid the epistemological fallacy.
LIS might have much to gain from a variety of socio-epistemological approaches. Both SE and LIS, however, seem in need of a more basic and conceptually less loaded foundation than the philosophy of knowledge itself. They both require a general philosophy of information (PI). SE has been for some time the philosophical field to which LIS could refer for its own theoretical needs, yet this should be seen as a second-best option. The closeness between LIS and SE is better understood if explained in terms of a common origin, as two branches of PI, rather than hierarchically. Time has come to have a closer look at PI itself.
What is the Philosophy of Information?
Philosophers have recently begun to address the new intellectual challenges arising from the world of information and the information society. 8 Their computational and information-theoretic researches have become increasingly fertile and pervasive. The scientific revolution made seventeenth century philosophers redirect their attention from the nature of the knowable object to the epistemic relation between it and the knowing subject, and hence from metaphysics to epistemology. The subsequent growth of the information society and the appearance of the infosphere (the semantic environment in which millions of people spend their time nowadays) have further influenced the development of contemporary philosophy. This has moved from focusing on the d omain represented by the memory and languages of organised knowledge, the instruments whereby the infosphere is managed, to focusing on the nature of its very fabric and essence, information itself. Information has thus arisen as a concept as fundamental a nd philosophically important as "being", "knowledge", "life", "intelligence", "meaning" or "moral good and evil"all pivotal concepts with which it is interdependentand so equally worthy of autonomous investigation. It is also a less "thick" concept, in t erms of which other concepts can be expressed and interrelated, when not defined. Polysemantic concepts such as information can be fruitfully investigated only in relation to well-specified contexts of use. PI treats "computation" as only one of the processes in which information can be involved. Thus, the field should be interpreted as a philosophy of information rather than just of computation, in the same sense in which epistemology is the philosophy of knowledge, not just of perception.
From an environmental perspective, PI is prescriptive about, and legislates on, what may count as information, and how information should be adequately created, processed, managed and used. However, PI's phenomenological bias does not mean that it fails to provide critical feedback. On the contrary, methodological and theoretical choices in ICS are also profoundly influenced by the kind of PI a researcher adopts more or less consciously. It is therefore essential to stress that PI critically evaluates, shapes and sharpens the conceptual, methodological and theoretical basis of ICS, in short that it also provides a philosophy of ICS, as this has been plain since early work in the area of philosophy of AI (Colburn 2000) .
It is worth stressing here that an excessive concern with the metatheoretical aspects of PI may lead one to miss the important f act that it is perfectly legitimate to speak of PI even in authors who lived centuries before the information revolution, and hence that it will be extremely fruitful to develop a historical approach and trace PI's diachronic evolution, as long as the technical and conceptual frameworks of ICS are not anachronistically applied, but are used to provide the conceptual method and information-theoretic semantics; information-theoretic epistemology; dynamic semantics); to analyse inferential and computational processes (philosophy of computing; philosophy of computer science; information-flow logic; situation logic);
to explain the organizational principles of life and agency (philosophy of artificial life; cybernetics and philosophy of automata; decision and game theory); to devise new approaches to modelling physical and conceptual systems (formal ontology; theory of information systems; philosophy of virtual reality); to formulate the methodology of scientific knowledge (model-based philosophy of science; computational methodologies in philosophy of science); to investigate ethical problems (computer and information ethics, artificial ethics), aesthetic issues (digital multimedia/hypermedia theory, hypertext theory and literary criticism) and psychological, anthropological and social phenomena c haracterising the information society and human behaviour in digital environments (cyberphilosophy). Indeed, the presence of these branches shows that PI satisfies criterion (iv). As a new field, it provides a unified and cohesive, theoretical framework t hat allows further specialisation.
PI possesses one of the most powerful conceptual vocabularies ever devised in philosophy. This is because we can rely on informational concepts whenever a complete understanding of some series of events is unavailable or unnecessary for providing an explanation. In philosophy, virtually any issue can be rephrased in informational terms. This semantic power is a great advantage of PI understood as a methodology (see PI.b). It shows that we are dealing with an influential p aradigm, describable in terms of an informational philosophy. But it may also be a problem, because a metaphorically "pan-informational" approach can lead to a dangerous equivocation, namely thinking that since anything can be described in (more or less metaphorically) informational terms, then everything has a genuinely informational nature. The equivocation is clear if one considers, for example, the difference between modelling the production chain that links authors, publishers and librarians as an information process, and representing digestion as if it were an information process.
The equivocation obscures PI's specificity as a philosophical field with its own subject. In particular, PI runs the risk of becoming synonymous with philosophy and become a sort of "everythingism". And if we are not careful, this can badly damaged our efforts in the next section to define LIS as applied PI.
The best way of avoiding this loss of identity and specificity in PI and consequently in LIS is to concentrate on the first half of the definition. PI as a philosophical discipline is defined by what a problem is (or can be reduced to be) about, not by how a problem can be formulated. Although many philosophical issues seem to benefit greatly from an informational analysis, in PI information theory provides a literal foundation not just a metaphorical superstructure. PI presupposes that a problem or an explanation can genuinely and legitimately be reduced to an informational problem or explanation. Therefore, the criterion to test the soundness of the informational analysis of x is not to check whether that x can be formulated, shaped or presented in information terms but to ask what would be like for x not to have an informational nature at all. 
Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Information
Now that we have a clearer idea of what PI is, we can combine the analyses developed in the previous two sections and concentrate on the advantages of defining LIS as applied PI.
PI presents itself also as a philosophy of LIS. This means that LIS could be interpreted as applied PI and that the latter could replace SE entirely as LIS' theoretical foundation. This hypothesis has recently been supported by Herold (2001) :
To the extent that librarianship is an applied philosophy of information, it seeks to discover the roots of phases of information dynamics in the course of our traditional work. Together with research beyond librarianship, our goal has ever been the design and functioning of effective information services. Investigation of the nature of information should reveal characteristics and properties which serve to better our understanding of its relationships with other types of things. The results of such efforts should enhance the many avenues of existing practice and at least take expression in these familiar terms.
Is PI a viable alternative to SE as a foundation of LIS? To see that it is, let us review the four variables of approach, level, object and scope of research and goal.
• like PI, LIS accepts the post-Cartesian approach represented by the dynamic frame of distributed intelligence and multi-agents' interactions; • like PI, LIS is not purely metatheoretical but has a phenomenologically-biased level of investigation and a holistic and encyclopaedic scope. There is no specific or unique theory, science or other body of knowledge studied by LIS (if there were this would simply deny the obvious encyclopaedic stance of LIS). Are we then to conclude that LIS is a purely phenomenological science, in the sense seen above? Of course not. LIS does have an intrinsic vocation to look at its objects from a second-order level. The fact is that LIS shares with PI a tension between the two perspectives, and should not be merely reduced to one or the other;
• LIS' object of research is information not in the strong, technical sense of wellformed, meaningful and truthful data (Floridi forthcoming), but in the weaker and more specific sense of recorded data or documents.
14 Archibald MacLeish, cited by Gorman (2000, 18) Unfortunately, many past attempts to take advantage of this opportunity appear to have moved in the wrong direction. Researchers have been lured by a variety of friendly but pre-established philosophies instead of fighting for their own place in the philosophical field. Thus, Zwadlo (1997) has noted that, for librarianship obtaining a philosophy is something like borrowing a book from our libraries. But, like the borrowed books, the borrowed philosophies do not really belong to us, always seem to need to be renewed, and we end up returning them, only to borrow others. (p. 105).
Sometimes this "borrowing process" between LIS and philosophy has been mediated by SE itself and its interdisciplinary methodology (Shera 1970 is a good example). In any case, the result has been, in the words of Pierce (1992) , a sort of intellectual ghetto:
Our field imports theory from communications, education, linguistics, management, psychology, sociology, and a host of other disciplines. How odd. Not many other disciplines accept dissertations grounded in the intellectual traditions of other fields. This research is less interdisciplinary than what might be called 'out-disciplinary'. Such research seeks theoretical foundation in other disciplines, rather than using selective importation to enrich our own. We live in a kind of intellectual ghetto; our most talented researchers seek favor by imitating practices of disciplines considered superior to our own. (p. 641) We have paid so little attention to our own intellectual history that we may have to reconstruct it -almost from scratch. (p. 643).
Yet, the historical opportunity remains. The foundationalist debate has lasted for so long because LIS was looking for something that was not available yet, namely PI. As a new research area that has only very recently become a recognisable academic field, PI can indicate the direction to take, but much groundwork still needs to be done and LIS can provide an essential contribution. 
